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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, 
and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs 
are dependent on the amount of annual emissions of regulated companies and if there are 
differences in transaction costs between economic sectors. The results indicate that 
administrative costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions for larger companies 
which has implications for the economic efficiency of the EU ETS. The most important 
finding, however, is that there are significant differences in MRV transaction costs dependent 
on the ‘type’ and ‘size’ of companies. This implies the existence of considerable economies of 
scale. Overall, the EU ETS could benefit from reforms by means of a push towards upstream 
regulation as this would likely increase administrative efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Transaction costs can decrease the economic efficiency of emissions trading systems 
substantially, especially if they cause irregular cost burdens among regulated companies. The 
attention for transaction costs in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has increased in 
recent years. So far, the literature principally focuses on transaction costs for allowance trading, 
while the impact of administrative transaction costs is underexposed. Administrative costs occur 
as a result of mandatory compliance obligations, i.e. monitoring, reporting, and verification of 
annual emissions (MRV). Accurate reporting and a verification of emissions are indispensable for 
the proper functioning of emissions trading programmes or carbon taxes. Hence, administrative 
costs for MRV are to some degree unavoidable. Recognising the importance of accurate MRV for 
the proper functioning of systems, such as the EU ETS, the next question to ask is if 
administrative costs, among other things, should be regarded as an important issue for policy 
design. Thus, there is a trade-off between aspects of MRV transaction costs on the one hand and 
necessary MRV obligations on the other hand. Both aspects need to be considered for the design 
of emissions trading systems.  
This paper investigates the impact of MRV transaction costs on the efficiency of the EU ETS 
empirically by using a unique set of administrative compliance data which are linked to firm-
level survey data. The effects of MRV transaction costs are relevant in two aspects, namely with 
respect to marginal transaction costs and with respect to average transaction costs. Non-zero 
marginal costs could  cause disadvantages for the overall economic efficiency of the EU ETS 
since they would affect the output decisions of regulated companies (Mundaca, Mansoz, Neij, & 
Timilsina, 2013). Substantial differences in average costs (e.g. as a result of high fixed 
transaction costs) would imply economies of scale in the MRV process and could cause high 
administrative costs per unit of emissions. In order to shed light on the question of whether or not 
MRV transaction costs should be regarded as an important issue in policy design within the scope 
of the EU ETS, we examine if there is empirical evidence for the existence of non-zero marginal 
costs or of substantial differences in average costs.  
The European Commission has emphasised the importance of ‘administrative efficiency’ in the 
EU ETS and aims at reducing unnecessary administrative burdens for small emitters (directive 
2009/29/EC, paragraph 11). However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence regarding this 
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issue. The empirical assessment of administrative costs at the firm-level is a prerequisite for an 
informed policy debate and a possible future reform of the EU ETS (Joas & Flachsland, 2014, 
Sec. 4.3). The insights gained from the EU ETS may also influence the design of (future) climate 
policy instruments other than the EU ETS. Two aspects are of particular interest in this case. 
Firstly, it is essential to examine whether administrative costs are dependent on the size of 
regulated companies or the amount of annual emissions of companies, and secondly, to 
investigate if costs differ between different types of firms or industrial installations. The latter 
aspect has received little attention in the literature so far.   
This paper is organised as follows. A brief literature review is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
provides a description of data, the empirical model specification, the identification strategy, and 
details on the proposed testable hypotheses. Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 
5 concludes.  
2. The Literature 
Economic efficiency is of central interest to the design of economic instruments for climate 
protection. Although transaction costs are not the only aspects that have to be taken into account 
for policy design1, they are frequently discussed as an important source of excess costs under 
emissions trading with negative consequences for economic efficiency (Hahn & Stavins, 2011). 
However, there is still a significant lack of empirical evidence regarding the extent of transaction 
costs and their relevance in practice.  
Most of the literature on transaction costs in emissions trading revolves around the costs for 
trading of allowances. Stavins (1995)  shows that transaction costs for allowance trading (e.g. 
trading fees) can reduce trading, and in doing so, increase overall costs and decrease economic 
efficiency . The initial distribution of allowances is relevant in this situation in so far that the 
‘independence property’ is violated.2 Trading related transaction costs are seen as having 
                                                          
1 Examples are the uncertainty of costs and the benefits of regulation (Hepburn, 2006) or political feasibility. The 
latter aspect has been of particular importance for policy choice and design in the European Union as coordination 
between member states and pre-existing regulations in some member states imposed a number of additional 
restrictions to policy choice and design (Ellerman, Convery, & De Pertuis, 2010).  
2 Montgomery (1972) showed that the initial permit distribution will not be essential for the final outcome of 
regulation under cap-and-trade, and that overall control costs will be unaffected by the initial allocation. The 
allocation of allowances, thus, is an issue related to distributional aspects but does not affect cost efficiency. This is 
also called the ‘independence property’ (Hahn & Stavins, 2011).  
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potential adverse  effects on economic efficiency in the EU ETS (Jaraitė-Kažukauskė & 
Kažukauskas, 2014). 
However, the term ‘transaction costs’ is used with respect to a wider range of costs other than 
transaction costs for allowance trading. The most relevant category in the EU ETS is the one 
related ex-post MRV transaction costs. While transaction costs for allowance trading solely occur 
in companies which actually trade (Jaraitė-Kažukauskė & Kažukauskas, 2014), MRV transaction 
costs arise in every firm due to mandatory annual MRV obligations.  
Merely a few contributions in literature focus on MRV costs in the EU ETS. Schleich and Betz 
(2004) point out that MRV costs for small and medium sized companies in the EU ETS could be 
large and should be evaluated carefully. Based on 27 interviews, Jaraite et al. (2010) show that 
the EU ETS has caused considerable MRV transaction costs in its implementation phase in 
Ireland in the period between 2005 and 2007, in particular for smaller firms or smaller emitters of 
carbon dioxide. With respect to MRV transaction costs, Jaraite et al. (2010, p. 198) report larger 
average costs per unit of emissions for small firms (1.51 EUR/tCO2) when compared to large 
firms (0.02 EUR/tCO2).  
Joas and Flachsland (2014, Sec. 4.1) state that nonlinearities occur in MRV costs. Differences in 
MRV costs per unit of emissions between small and large emitters and the ratio between small 
and large entities under regulation are discussed as important aspects for policy design, i.e. when 
regulation should take place ‘upstream’ or ‘downstream’ (Joas & Flachsland, 2014, Sec. 4.3). 
Kerr and Dusch (2015) consider transaction costs as part of an argument which is in favour of an 
upstream orientated regulation. Overall, MRV transaction costs are crucial with respect to the 
resulting total costs of firms caused by the EU ETS with consequences for ex-post allocation and 
efficiency (Mundaca et al., 2013, p. 494).3  
Although research conducted by Ofei-Mensah and Bennett (2013) indicates that transaction costs 
for MRV activities are of great relevance for emissions trading programmes, the issue has 
received limited attention in the empirical literature on this topic so far (see also Mundaca et al., 
2013, p. 502),  partly due to a lack of data. This paper aims at filling this gap by empirically 
                                                          
3 One example is given by Kampas and White (2004). The authors showed that the optimal choice of taxation for the 
regulation of agricultural non-point source pollutants is dependent on administrative costs. When administrative 
costs are omitted, optimal policy design will differ as if administrative costs are included. A consistent emissions tax 
would be preferable in the former case, while a tax on inputs would be cost-minimising in the latter. 
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investigating the extent of MRV transaction costs in the EU ETS. We examine the presence of 
non-zero marginal transaction costs in order to identify potential effects that MRV transaction 
costs might have on economic efficiency, as suggested by Mundaca et al. (2013) and Joas and 
Flachsland (2014). In addition to that, we investigate average transaction costs dependent on the 
firm-size and firm-type in Germany in order to allow for a detailed differentiation between 
various kinds of MRV transaction costs in the EU ETS. To our best knowledge, there is no 
detailed account with respect to the effects of ‘firm-types’ in relation to MRV transaction costs in 
literature so far.  
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data Description 
The empirical analysis is based on two data sources. The amount of annual verified emissions, 
the information on free allocation, the number of EU ETS installations operated by firms, and the 
type of installation (i.e. if combustion installation or any other type) are derived from official EU 
compliance data, as published in the ‘European Independent Transaction Log’ (EUTL, 2013). 
The remaining data is collected from annual surveys of German firms in the EU ETS. Tables 1 
and 2 comprise the data description and summary statistics.  
The panel covers three years (2010 to 2012). Responsible managers of all EU ETS regulated 
companies in Germany received an online questionnaire annually in March, at a time when 
companies usually need to submit their compliance documents. These managers were the contact 
persons at the installation level, as documented in the German ETS registry. In case a company 
was operating more than one installation, the responsible manager of the largest installation (in 
terms of annual emissions) was contacted. The survey included questions about the company’s 
main activity (economic sector based on NACE) and, in addition, discrete categories regarding 
the number of employees.  
Every manager was asked to provide an estimation of the labour days per annum that have been 
spent on different categories of EU ETS related activities which might have caused transaction 
costs (MRV obligation, trading, general information gathering, and legal costs). Additional costs 
for external services related to the different activities could be reported separately, similar to the 
methodology applied by Ofei-Mensah and Bennett (2013) (for details on the questionnaire see 
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Appendix A1). The reported days, which were spent on management obligations related to the 
EU ETS, were transformed into the equivalent euro value by applying hourly wages on average 
for 2012.These wages differed not only between the 16 German federal states (Länder) but also 
between the energy sector and the producing industry sector, as reported by the German 
Statistical Office.4 It was assumed that a work day comprised eight hours. All costs were 
inflation-adjusted to the price level of 2012. The total MRV transaction costs (variable tcMRV) 
comprised labour costs and the costs of external services reported for MRV activities. 
The definition of the variable tcMRV is motivated by the requirements of the MRV process. This 
process consists of three steps as described in the following. Firstly, installations need to monitor 
emissions over time. This frequently occurs by documenting fuel consumption, i.e. in the case of 
combustion installations. Monitoring procedures differ depending on the type of installations. 
There are comprehensive guidelines provided by the German emissions trading authority 
(DEHSt) in which requirements and procedures are specified. Secondly, the amount of emissions 
needs to be annually reported until the end of March. Reporting is organised via an online-
platform. In addition to (internal) monitoring and reporting obligations, a mandatory external 
verification of reported emissions is required. The reported figures need to be approved by 
accredited third-party consultants before the official MRV process is completed. In some cases, 
companies need to undergo an additional review process of the DEHSt. While monitoring and 
reporting principally cause internal costs (i.e. labour costs), verification  causes external costs 
(see also Mundaca et al., 2013, p. 503). Therefore, the questionnaire provided different sections 
in which labour input and external costs could be separately reported (see Appendix A1). 
External consultancy costs are also mentioned as an essential cost category by Jaraite et al. (2010, 
p. 199).5 The term ‘administrative transaction costs’ will exclusively refer to the above-
mentioned transaction costs for MRV in the following. 
Overall, 15% of German companies regulated by the EU ETS are covered by the survey over the 
course of all three years. Table 1 comprises details on the data structure. Official compliance data 
                                                          
4 Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, ‘Verdienste, Arbeitskosten – Nettoarbeitskosten je 
geleistete Stunde im Jahr 2012 im Produzierenden Gewerbe und im Dienstleistungsbereich. 
http://www.statistikportal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb22_ake02.asp (accessed 6 May 2015).  
5 It is possible that other additional types of costs are relevant in the MRV process, for instance, costs attributable to 
such expenditures as office equipment, electronic devices, software and so on. As these types of costs will only be 
partly attributable to the MRV process and since the share of the costs attributable to the MRV process is difficult to 
estimate, we distance ourselves from these type of ‘overhead costs’ and focus on the most important cost 
components. 
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and survey data are merged on the basis of a unique firm identification number. As official 
compliance data are reported at the installation level and firm survey data are collected at the 
company level, compliance data are aggregated to the firm level. In total, a number of 237 
observations (154 firms) are available. In order to rectify a potential bias of the sample towards 
‘large firms’, weights which also take the non-response bias into account are applied (see 
Appendix A2).  
 [Table 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of the (unweighted) natural logarithm (log) of annual verified 
emissions (logverem) and the natural logarithm of annual MRV transaction costs (logtcMRV). A 
linear model fit with a 95 per cent confidence interval was added. The figure suggests a positive 
correlation between verified emissions and MRV transaction costs. Moreover, it indicates that 
there are considerable fixed costs for compliance which is in accordance with the findings of 
Jaraite et al. (2010).  
The median of total MRV costs per year for all firms in the sample amounts to 7.0 thousand euro 
(tEUR). For firms emitting less than 25.000 tCO2 p.a., it amounts to 5.0 tEUR; for firms emitting 
25.000 up to 100.000 tCO2 p.a., it amounts to 6.3 tEUR; and for firms emitting more than 
100.000 tCO2 p.a., it amounts 12.5 tEUR. Thus, if the number of emissions per annum increases, 
the overall MRV costs increase simultaneously. The median of MRV costs per year and per unit 
of CO2 emissions for all firms in the sample amounts to 0.17 euro (EUR). For firms emitting less 
than 25.000 tCO2 p.a., it amounts to 0.71 EUR; for firms emitting 25.000 up to 100.000 tCO2 
p.a., it amounts to 0.16 EUR; and for firms emitting more than 100.000 tCO2 p.a., it amounts to 
0.03 EUR. As expected, we observe a strong ‘size-effect’ in MRV transaction costs per unit of 
emissions.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1: Scatterplot of the log of MRV transaction costs in euros (logtcMRV) and the log of 
verified annual emissions (logverem) which incorporates a fitted log-log pooled OLS model 
including an interval of 95 per cent confidence. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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3.2 Economic Background and Hypothesis 
If marginal transaction costs are non-zero, the marginal (shadow) price for emissions will be 
altered (Mundaca et al., 2013). Hence, transaction costs will have negative consequences for 
economic efficiency if marginal MRV transaction costs are dependent on a company’s amount of 
emissions.  The empirical examination of transaction costs related to MRV activities has to 
comprise non-zero marginal transaction costs in order to allow for a test of this hypothesis. Thus, 
it is assumed that function 𝑓𝑓 which describes MRV transaction costs is dependent on annual 
verified emissions 𝑣𝑣 of a firm. Given the parameterisation 𝑓𝑓(𝑣𝑣) = 𝑏𝑏0𝑣𝑣𝑏𝑏1, which can be easily 
transformed into a linear elasticity model for the empirical application, it is possible to test 
several hypotheses once the parameters are estimated. Administrative costs decrease with the 
amount of annual emissions if 𝑏𝑏1 < 0, are independent of emissions if 𝑏𝑏1 = 0, and increase with 
the amount of annual emissions if 𝑏𝑏1 > 0. If 0 < 𝑏𝑏1 < 1, the transaction costs of MRV increase 
at a lower rate than for the amount of annual emissions which would imply economies of scale in 
MRV activities as already indicated by the descriptive figures presented in the data description. 
Parameter 𝑏𝑏0 > 0 is a scale parameter which represents ‘fixed’ MRV transaction costs that are 
independent of verified emissions. 
The parameters of interest are estimated for different types of firms (economic sector or 
installation type) and for firms of various sizes (in terms of employees). For this purpose, we 
introduce indicator variables (‘dummies’) in order to differentiate between 𝑏𝑏0. We also introduce 
interaction terms with the log of annual verified emissions to differentiate 𝑏𝑏1 by firm type and 
size (in terms of the number of employees). Indicator variables and interaction terms are 
summarised in Table 2. Based on the parameter estimates, it is possible to test for statistical 
differences in MRV transaction costs paid by firms of different types and sizes depending on 
verified emissions and other control variables. 
3.4. Empirical Model 
In the following step, the coefficients 𝑏𝑏0 and 𝑏𝑏1 are estimated. Taking the natural logarithm on 
both sides of 𝑓𝑓 yields a standard linear elasticity model which allows for a direct estimation of 
the coefficients of interest.    log(𝑓𝑓) = log (𝑏𝑏0) + 𝑏𝑏1 log(𝑣𝑣).       (1) 
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We are interested in estimating an augmented version of (1) by using a panel model which has 
the general form 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.        (2) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the MRV transaction costs, 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of variables which is expected to determine 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
is a firm-specific and unobserved effect that is either time fixed or random, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. If there is no correlation between 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, an estimation with random 
effects is the appropriate measure. The standard procedure to test whether a fixed or a random 
effects model has to be applied is the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that ‘no systematic 
difference of coefficients’ exists between random and fixed effects. With a p-value of 0.68 and a 
Chi-square value of 6.59, the Null cannot be rejected. Therefore, a random effects model is 
chosen.  
Random effects models require the assumptions of strict exogeneity and orthogonality of the 
unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. The variance matrix must be of full rank with 
variance 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ) = 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 for 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑡𝑡 and serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. Thus, random 
effects require the conditional variances and covariances to be zero, and a homoscedastic 
structure of the variance of the unobserved effect is needed (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 10.4). As 
visual and numerical tests on homoscedasticity of the composite error 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicate that it is 
likely to have a heteroscedastic pattern in the data, robust standard errors are used. To avoid 
serial correlation in the error terms, time dummies are added to model specifications (3) in Table 
3 to test for time trends, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 261).  
As we are interested in estimating the effect of differing levels of annual emissions on MRV 
transaction costs, we specify a linear elasticity panel model of the form log (𝑐𝑐)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log(𝑣𝑣)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .     (3) 
The model contains verified emissions log(𝑣𝑣)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as an independent variable along with a matrix of 
dummy variables and interaction terms 𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which contains further firm characteristics, as 
reported in Table 2 (data description) and Table 3 (estimation results).  
 
 
9 
 
4. Estimation and Results 
Estimation results are reported in Table 3. The log of MRV transaction costs per year (logtcMRV) 
is the dependent variable. Independent variables are the log of verified annual emissions 
(logverem), indicator variables for small companies (1-249 employees) (dsma), for medium sized 
companies (250-1000 employees) (dmed), and for combustion installations (dcomb), for the 
allocation factor (aldifactor), and for the number of ETS installations operated by a company 
(instnr). Additional indicator variables for economic sectors are included (dutility, dglas, dpaper, 
dchemic). Indicator variables for the years 2011 and 2012 are denoted as 11.year and 12.year. 
Interaction terms between indicator variables and the log of annual verified emissions are denoted 
as [variable]_logver. The following interpretation of results is based on Column (1) in Table 3. 
However, the results are robust for all of the reported model specifications. 
[Table 3 about here] 
4.1 Fixed Transaction Costs 
Differences in the level of ‘fixed’ transaction costs for MRV activities (viz. the costs which are 
independent of the amount of annual emissions) are identified by indicator variables and a 
constant. In this respect, the most important results  are the observed effects for small companies 
(1 to 249 employees, variable dsma) and utility companies (variable dutility). Small companies 
face larger fixed MRV transaction costs when compared to other types of companies, whereas 
utility companies face lower fixed MRV transaction costs. Sector indicator variables for glass 
production, paper production, the chemical industry, and for combustion installations are not 
statistically different from zero. There are no significant effects for medium sized companies 
(250 to 1000 employees) when compared to the reference category ‘large firms’ (more than 1000 
employees).    
4.2 Marginal Transaction Costs     
The positive coefficient of the variable ‘log of annual verified emissions’ (logverem) in Table 3 
indicates that MRV transaction costs are positively correlated with the amount of annual 
emissions, as expected. The coefficient is greater than zero and smaller than one (p-value: 0.01). 
This implies that there are economies of scale in the MRV process because the observed MRV 
transaction costs increase at a lower rate than emissions. Therefore, MRV transaction costs per 
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unit of emissions are lower for companies with a large amount of annual emissions when 
compared to companies with a small amount of emissions.   
In order to determine if the marginal effect of annual emissions on MRV transaction costs is 
contingent on a company’s size and type, joint parameter tests of indicator variables and the 
interaction terms are required. The marginal effect of annual verified emissions on MRV 
transaction costs is different for small companies (1-249 employees) when compared to other 
types of companies. The joint marginal effect (logverem + dsma_logver) is not statistically 
different from zero (p-value: 0.70) which indicates zero marginal MRV transaction costs for 
small companies. Interaction terms of the log of annual verified emissions and medium sized 
companies (dmed_logver) as well as combustion installations (dcomb_logver) do not show any 
statistically significant effect.  
4.3 Average Transaction Costs 
The combination of large fixed costs and non-zero marginal MRV transaction costs for 
companies with more than 249 employees also leads to pronounced differences in average MRV 
transaction costs, as predicted by model (1) in Table 3.6 For instance, consider a non-utility 
company with more than 249 employees. For a company with about 25,000 tCO2 emissions per 
year, average MRV transaction costs amount to 0.47 euro per tCO2. For a company with about 
100,000 tCO2 emissions per year, average costs amount to 0.14 euro per tCO2. At the level of 
1,000,000 tCO2 emissions per year, average costs amount to 0.05 euro per tCO2.  
Costs are lower for utility companies. MRV transaction costs amount to 0.23 euro per tCO2 for a 
company with approximately 25,000 tCO2 emissions per year, 0.07 euro per tCO2 for a company 
with approximately 100,000 tCO2 emissions per year, and 0.02 euro per tCO2 emissions for a 
company with approximately 1,000,000 tCO2 emissions per year. Thus, although there are effects 
related to the ‘type’ of company (viz. the type of economic activity), there are also important 
effects related to the ‘size’ of a company in terms of the annual amount of CO2 emissions. In 
accordance with the descriptive statistics presented in the data description and previous work by 
                                                          
6 The average MRV transaction costs presented in this section are derived from a prediction of estimation (1) in 
Table 3. The figures are different from those presented in the data description because figures in the data description 
are median values covering the whole sample without any differentiation by company type. 
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Jaraite et al. (2010), average MRV transaction costs are higher for companies with small amounts 
of annual emissions when compared to companies with larger amounts of annual emissions.   
4.4 Robustness of Results 
Four regressions are reported in Table 3. Column (1) reports a weighted maximum likelihood 
random effects regressionwith jackknife standard errors. Weihts are applied to correct a potential 
bias towards larger firms in the sample. Column (2) reports a random effects regression with 
robust standard errors and additional interaction terms. Column (3) reports a random effects 
regression with additional year indicator variables in order to test for potential time trends in the 
data. Column (4) reports a random effects regression where the largest 1% of companies (in 
terms of annual emission) is omitted from the sample as an additional robustness check. 
Regression (1) includes weights to account for a potential bias towards larger companies in the 
survey. The coefficients of main interest (variable logverem), firm-size indicator variables, and 
interaction terms (if significant) are slightly lower when compared to the non-weighted 
regressions (2) and (3), and larger when compared to regression (4) which omits the largest 
companies. This implies that weighting is essential in order to avoid a potential bias of results. 
The insignificant interaction term between the indicator variable for utility companies and the log 
of verified emissions (dutil_logver) in regression (2) questions the hypothesis that marginal MRV 
transaction costs differ for utility companies when compared to other sectors. The insignificant 
year indicator variables (11.year, 12.year) in regression (3) imply that there are no time trends in 
MRV transaction costs after inflation adjustment.  
4.5 Limitations 
As the paper uses self-reported data on MRV transaction costs, there is some ambiguity regarding 
the accurateness of the reported costs. The limited number of available observations and the 
presence of time-invariant variables (e.g. sector or firm size) impose further limitations with 
respect to model choice and estimation. However, the effects of main interest are highly robust 
throughout various model specifications. These effects are (1) the positive correlation of annual 
verified emissions and MRV transaction costs for ‘larger’ companies (more than 249 employees), 
(2) the differences in ‘fixed’ MRV transaction costs for small companies (1-249 employees) as 
well as for utility vs. non-utility companies, and (3) zero marginal MRV transaction costs for 
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small companies. It is possible that additional effects could have been observed if a richer dataset 
had been available. Examples are a possible non-linear pattern in MRV transaction costs or more 
detailed effects with respect to firm size and type in connection with ‘fixed’, marginal, and 
average MRV transaction costs.  
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The empirical picture sketched above has four important implications. Firstly, MRV transaction 
costs are positively correlated with the amount of annual emissions of larger companies (more 
than 249 employees). This implies that marginal MRV transaction costs are non-zero with 
possible negative consequences for economic efficiency, as already discussed in literature 
(Mundaca et al., 2013). Secondly, the result implies that there are economies of scale in the MRV 
process. The estimated coefficient of the independent variable ‘log of annual verified emissions’ 
(logverem) is significantly larger than zero but also significantly lower than one (p-value: 0.01).  
Thirdly, ‘fixed’ MRV transaction costs are lower for utility companies when compared to other 
companies. A possible reason for this finding is that MRV procedures are highly standardised in 
utility companies and that the monitoring of emissions is less expensive since it is based on the 
carbon content of the burned fuels. Finally, MRV transaction costs are not dependent on the 
amount of annual emissions for small companies (less than 250 employees). However, small 
companies report large ‘fixed’ transaction costs when compared to other companies. Significant 
differences in average MRV transaction costs represent a cost-disadvantage for smaller 
companies or companies with a smaller amount of annual verified emissions when compared to 
larger firms.  
For instance, MRV transaction costs amount to approximately 0.47 euro per tCO2 for a non-
utility company with more than 249 employees and annual emissions of about 25,000 tCO2 (see 
Section 4.3). Assuming an EU allowance price of 7 euros, MRV transaction costs amount to 
approximately 7% of the allowance price, as observed in the first half year of 2015. The situation 
is entirely different if a company with a large amount of annual emissions is considered. A 
company with annual emissions of approximately 1,000,000 tCO2 faces MRV transaction costs 
of 0.05 euro per tCO2. This is less than 1% of the allowance price. Thus, there are important 
differences in MRV transaction costs with respect to the annual amount of emissions. MRV 
transaction costs per unit of emissions are large for companies with smaller amounts of annual 
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emissions due to the existence of large fixed costs. This implies that the overall burden of MRV 
transaction costs could have been effectively decreased if small emitters had been excluded from 
the direct regulation under the EU ETS. 
Overall, the results indicate that there are important ‘size’ and ‘technology’ effects which are 
correlated with MRV transaction costs in the EU ETS. While there is some empirical evidence 
for ‘size’ effects in the empirical literature (Jaraite et al., 2010), there is no consideration for 
‘technology’ effects so far to our best knowledge. The findings have important policy 
implications as MRV transaction costs are relevant for policy design in the light of administrative 
efficiency. This aspect has also been acknowledged by the European Commission in directive 
2009/29/EC, paragraph 11.  
A possible solution to the problem of large average burdens by MRV transaction costs for smaller 
companies would be the exclusion (or opt-out) of these. This, however, would undermine the 
effectiveness of the ETS as less sources of greenhouse gas emissions would be covered by the 
system after an opt-out of small companies. Thus, an out-out provision can be expected to 
increase administrative efficiency by reducing average MRV transaction costs. However, this will 
occur at the expense of a decreased coverage of polluters and a potential decrease in economic 
efficiency.7 Thus, MRV transaction costs play an important role for policy design among other 
aspects.8 This represents a trade-off between broad coverage of emissions and the avoidance of 
large MRV transaction costs per unit of emissions for some regulated companies. 
A possible way to decrease transaction cost burdens while preserving effectiveness and broad 
coverage of regulation would be a strict ‘upstream’ policy design (Joas & Flachsland, 2014; Kerr 
& Duscha, 2015). In the EU ETS, regulation takes place at the installation level in an ‘end of the 
pipe’ manner. This makes the inclusion of small installations necessary. Under upstream 
regulation (as interpreted here), the carbon content of intermediate products (e.g. fossil fuels) is 
‘priced’ by the upstream regulation system in the moment  the products are put on the market 
(Kerr & Duscha, 2015). In this case, greenhouse gas emissions are ‘priced’ at the source and not 
at the level of final (commercial) consumers. In this situation, the overall prices of carbon-
intensive intermediate products incorporate the carbon price in case the products are resold. Such 
                                                          
7 Efficiency could decrease if low-cost abatement options existed in companies which are opted-out or excluded 
from regulation. 
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an approach is applicable to the energy sector and has been included in the design of the 
Australian carbon pricing scheme (Jotzo, 2012) which was repealed in July 2014.  
Under upstream regulation, many businesses would not need to be actively covered by cap-and-
trade, i.e. in cases when fossil fuels are purchased to fuel small or medium sized combustion 
installations. These companies would not be required to carry out MRV activities which would 
reduce overall transaction costs. Such a design could help to increase the administrative 
efficiency of climate policy and would offer the option of a broader indirect coverage of 
polluters, e.g. small businesses or additional sectors such as transportation.  
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Appendix A1: Questionnaire (wave of March 2012, translation) 
The participants had the opportunity to choose one of the displayed options per question, except 
in the case of the question on administrative costs, where the survey participants were asked to 
type in the workdays per year and costs in EUR per year or alternatively to choose the 
“unknown” option. Each question offered the option “unknown” for those cases in which the 
survey participants were unable or unwilling to respond.  
Q: Please indicate the average number of employees in your company over the year 2011. If 
your company is part of a corporate group, please indicate the number of employees of the 
whole corporate group. 
 Up to 49 employees 
 50 to 249 employees 
 250 to 1000 employees 
 More than 1000 employees 
 Unknown 
 
Q: In which branch of the economy is your company predominantly active? Please refer to 
the most important product group that is directly or indirectly regulated by the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
 Energy and/or heat generation (e.g. utility company) 
 Food products, beverages, or animal feeds 
 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products  
 Paper and paper products, printing  
 Coke and refined petroleum products 
 Chemicals and chemical products 
 Rubber and plastic products 
 Glass, glass products, ceramic, lime and plaster 
 Basic metals (iron and steel, non-ferrous metals etc.) 
 Fabricated metal products 
 Machinery 
 Motor vehicles and component suppliers 
 Computer, electronic, and optical products. Electrical equipment 
 Others 
 Unknown 
 
Q: How do you assess the current annual administrative transaction costs of the EU ETS 
for monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions in your company? 
Labour input (inside company) days per year, approx. _________________ 
Costs of external services and other costs in EUR per year, approx. _________________ 
Unknown  
17 
 
Transaction costs have been assessed in the same manner as MRV costs for the additional 
categories of “transaction costs for trading”, and “information costs.” An additional option “no 
such costs” and an option to indicate that the surveyed person cannot answer the question has 
been provided in order to ensure that different types of transaction costs can be distinguished and 
that all relevant information on transaction costs are gathered.  
 
Appendix A2: Calculation of Weights 
To avoid biased results due to a domination of large firms in the regression, weights are applied. 
Weights are calculated on the basis of the ex-ante probability that firm 𝑖𝑖 will participate in the 
survey 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1). Given 𝑁𝑁 firms in the population, this probability is defined by 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1) =1/𝑁𝑁. A second component is related to the self-selection of firms that actually participate in the 
survey. Thus, the probability of participation 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1) is estimated by using a probit 
model that encompasses the dependent variables ‘log of verified emissions’ (logverem) and the 
activity types, as reported in the official compliance data. Weights are described by 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 =1/𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1) × 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1).   
 
Table 1: Total of ETS regulated companies in Germany and coverage by the survey. 
 2010 2011 2012 Overall 
Overall Germany     
Number of Companies 952 977 977 977 
Number of Installations 2077 1990 1826  
CO2 Emissions (MtCO2) 428 454 450  
CO2 Emissions (Median, TtCO2) 23.1 25.7 22.4  
     
Sample     
Number of Companies 65 76 98 154* 
Number of Installations 144 238 285  
CO2 Emissions (MtCO2) 111 51.2 231  
CO2 Emissions (Median, TtCO2) 31.5 35.9 43.0  
     
Sample Share     
Number of Companies 7% 8% 10% 15.8% 
Number of Installations 7% 12% 16%  
CO2-Emissions (MtCO2) 26% 11% 51%  
 
* The number of companies is not equal to the sum calculated over the years since many 
companies are covered in more than one year. 
 
 
Table 2: Sample description and summary statistics 
Variable Variable description Mean St. dev. 
tcMRV MRV transaction costs for compliance in EUR per year 61,075.71 264,630.43 
logtcMRV Natural logarithm of tcMRV (dependent variable) 9.09 1.33 
verem Verified emissions as reported in the official registry of 
the European Union (EU Independent Transaction Log) 
1,646,285.39 10,886,794.59 
logverem Natural logarithm of verem 10.79 2.32 
dsma = 1 if company is a small company (less or equal 249 
employees) 
0.41 0.49 
dsma_logver Interaction term of dsma and logverem 4.24 5.28 
dmed = 1 if company is a medium sized company (250-1000 
employees) 
0.31 0.47 
dmed_logver Interaction term of dmed and logverem 3.40 5.18 
aldifactor Allocation factor (number of received free allowances 
relative to verified emissions) 
13.11 159.76 
aldifa_logver Interaction term aldifactor and logverem 36.25 229.31 
instnr Number of EU ETS regulated installations operated by 
company 
2.79 6.00 
instnr_logver Interaction term instnr and logverem 37.62 103.66 
dcomb =1 if most installations are combustion installations 0.69 0.46 
dcomb_logver Interaction term dcomb and logverem 7.47 5.33 
dutility = 1 if company is a utility company  0.43 0.50 
dutil_logver Interaction term of dutility and logverem 4.83 5.82 
dglas =1 if company produces glass products 0.17 0.37 
dpaper =1 if company produces paper products 0.12 0.32 
dchemic =1 if company produces chemical products 0.07 0.26 
11.year =1 if year 2011  0.32 0.47 
12.year =1 if year 2012  0.41 0.49 
Overall number of observations n=237 for 154 companies 
 
 
Table 3: Estimation results (dependent variable: log of annual MRV transaction costs, 
variable logtcMRV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables logtcMRV logtcMRV logtcMRV logtcMRV 
     
logverem 0.308** 0.422*** 0.448*** 0.281*** 
 (0.140) (0.122) (0.109) (0.105) 
dsma 2.969** 4.985*** 5.183*** 2.813*** 
 (1.358) (1.194) (1.287) (0.956) 
dsma_logver -0.269** -0.455*** -0.465*** -0.252*** 
 (0.120) (0.104) (0.109) (0.0834) 
dmed 2.251 3.319*** 3.194** 1.949* 
 (1.372) (1.147) (1.326) (1.045) 
dmed_logver -0.212* -0.308*** -0.292** -0.180* 
 (0.122) (0.103) (0.117) (0.0926) 
dcomb -1.087 0.0394  -1.164 
 (1.279) (1.733)  (1.125) 
dcomb_logver 0.0606 -0.0432  0.0681 
 (0.108) (0.148)  (0.0950) 
aldifactor -0.00774 -0.00644*** -0.000730*** -0.00759*** 
 (0.0621) (0.00148) (0.000273) (0.000896) 
aldifa_logver 0.00513 0.00400***  0.00497*** 
 (0.0123) (0.00112)  (0.000631) 
instnr 0.0853 -0.0185 0.0193 0.216 
 (0.275) (0.205) (0.0194) (0.221) 
instnr_logver -0.00447 0.00136  -0.0128 
 (0.0171) (0.0120)  (0.0129) 
dutility -0.524** -2.193 -0.775** -0.557** 
 (0.263) (1.441) (0.303) (0.251) 
dutil_logver  0.154   
  (0.137)   
dglas -0.229 -0.201 -0.0607 -0.232 
 (0.519) (0.526) (0.352) (0.492) 
dpaper -0.585 -0.524 -0.523 -0.610 
 (0.422) (0.423) (0.343) (0.386) 
dchemic -0.597 -0.587 -0.666* -0.657* 
 (0.410) (0.423) (0.347) (0.387) 
11.year   -0.0497  
   (0.165)  
12.year   0.0466  
   (0.148)  
Constant 6.313*** 5.109*** 4.609*** 6.541*** 
 (1.571) (1.412) (1.166) (1.200) 
     
Observations 237 237 237 234 
Number of firms 154 154 154 152 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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